The U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) currently provides disability benefits to 2.72 million veterans of U.S. military service through the Disability Compensation (DC) program. Until recently, the medical eligibility criteria for this program were the same across service eras, with the key condition being that the disability was caused or aggravated by military service. But in July of 2001, the VA relaxed the eligibility criteria for Vietnam veterans by including diabetes in the list of conditions covered by DC. This change was motivated by an Institute of Medicine report, which linked exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides used by the U.S. military in Vietnam, to the onset of diabetes. In this paper, we investigate the impact of this policy change on DC enrollment, expenditures, and the sensitivity of the program to economic conditions. Our findings demonstrate that the Agent Orange decision increased DC enrollment by 7.6 percentage points among Vietnam veterans and that an additional 3.3 percent enjoyed an increase in their DC benefits. Our estimates further suggest that the policy change increased program expenditures by $2.69 billion during the 2006 fiscal year and by $45 billion in present value terms. After the policy took effect, we find that the sensitivity of the program to local economic conditions increased substantially. Taken together, our results suggest that even relatively narrow changes in the medical eligibility criteria for federal disability programs can have a powerful effect on program enrollment and expenditures.
I. Introduction
In August of 2006, the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) provided cash benefits to more than 11 percent of the nation's 24 million military veterans through the Disability Compensation (DC) program. Total program enrollment in that month was 2.72 million and expenditures for the 2006 fiscal year were approximately $25 billion. To qualify for DC benefits, a veteran must have one or more disabilities that were caused or aggravated by his military service.
The DC recipient then receives a monthly cash benefit along with essentially free medical care for the treatment of their disabilities through the Veterans Health Administration.
Until recently, the medical eligibility criteria for DC benefits have been essentially the same for veterans from all service eras. The key requirement was that a disability must have been caused or aggravated by military service. Thus individuals rarely qualified for DC because of conditions such as cancer and diabetes that first affected people long after their period of military service and for which service-connectedness would be difficult to prove. However in October of 2000 the National Institute of Medicine issued a report that linked exposure to Agent Orange, an herbicide used by the U.S. military in Vietnam, to the onset of diabetes. In July of 2001, the VA responded to this report by adding diabetes to the list of conditions for which a veteran who served in Vietnam during the war could qualify for DC benefits. There was no corresponding change for veterans from other eras.
In this paper we aim to estimate the impact of this policy change on DC enrollment, expenditures, and the sensitivity of the program to local economic conditions. Many previous authors have investigated these same types of issues for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the federal government's two other major disability programs (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002) . However, virtually no previous work has investigated the causes or consequences of DC enrollment. Bound and Burkhauser's 1999 Handbook of Labor Economics chapter on disability programs, 44 papers focus on SSDI, 17 consider SSI, and just 1 study examines DC. The one that considers DC is a descriptive paper that As Figure 1 demonstrates, the 2001 policy change coincided with a sharp break in trend in DC enrollment. From 1996 to 2001, the number of DC beneficiaries grew by just 0.6 percent per year. But during the next five years, the annual growth rate was five times greater at 3.3 percent. Of course, other factors may have been at least partly responsible for this break in trend. We therefore use veterans from peacetime eras, almost all of whom served shortly before or after the Vietnam era, as our comparison group to estimate the effect of the policy. While this group of veterans is clearly not a perfect control group, they had mortality rates and trends in DC enrollment that were quite similar to those for Vietnam-era veterans prior to the policy change as shown in Figure 2 .
Using aggregate data by service era in each year, our difference-in-differences estimates This increase represents 2.3 percent of all Vietnam-era veterans and 7.6 percent of those who actually served in Vietnam during the conflict there, as the policy change applied only to this latter group.
An additional possible effect of the Agent Orange decision was that Vietnam veterans already on the program could increase their monthly benefits if they were found to have diabetes.
The DC program pays benefits that are an increasing function of the recipient's combined disability rating (CDR). The CDR depends on the ratings for all of a recipient's rated disabilities, and thus a recipient who could obtain a rating for another condition would typically experience an increase in monthly benefits. Our results suggest that approximately 75,000 Vietnam veterans qualified for an increase in their benefits because of the 2001 policy change. Combined with the effect on enrollment, this suggests that 10.9 percent of the veterans who served in Vietnam and were still alive in 2006 experienced an increase in their DC benefits or became eligible for the program because of the less stringent medical eligibility criteria.
compares the economic well-being of individuals who receive SSDI, SSI, DC, or Workers' Compensation benefits (Burkhauser and Daly, 1999) in the U.S. with those who receive disability benefits in Germany.
We next investigate the effect of the change in the DC program's medical eligibility criteria on short and long-term expenditures for the program. To do this we estimate the impact of the policy change on the number of Vietnam-era DC recipients with each of the eleven possible CDRs, and then multiply this by average monthly benefits within each CDR. This algorithm captures the effect due to the increase in the number of recipients as well as the increase in benefits for some existing DC recipients. Our estimates suggest that DC expenditures during the 2006 fiscal year were $2.69 billion higher than they would have been in the absence of the Agent Orange decision. Aggregating the effect across all years, our estimates suggest that the present value of Disability Compensation spending increased by more than $45 billion as a result of the policy change.
In our final empirical section, we explore whether the change in the DC program's medical eligibility criteria influenced the sensitivity of the program to local economic conditions. A large literature has explored this issue for other government programs, including AFDC/TANF (Hoynes, 2000; Blank, 2001) , Medicaid (Cromwell et al, 1986) , food stamps (Ziliak et al, 2003) , SSDI (AutorDuggan, 2003) , and SSI (Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002; Rupp and Stapleton, 1998) . The likelihood of such a link for the DC program is not as clear as for these other programs given that DC benefits are not means-tested and thus the number eligible for the program does not increase as economic conditions deteriorate. Despite this, it is still plausible given that the demand for new sources of income is likely to be greater among those who are out of work or have low earnings.
Our findings demonstrate that DC expenditures did increase much more rapidly in high unemployment areas following the policy change. We detect no corresponding relationship between DC expenditure growth and this measure of economic conditions just prior to the policy change.
This result is robust to the inclusion of pre-existing trends in DC expenditures and is driven by spending on Vietnam-era veterans. It therefore appears that the liberalization of the program's medical eligibility criteria made spending for this one category of veterans more sensitive to local economic conditions but there is no corresponding change for their counterparts from other eras.
Taken together, our findings for the VA's Disability Compensation program suggest that changes in the medical eligibility criteria for disability programs can have a substantial impact on program enrollment and expenditures as well as on the responsiveness of the programs to economic conditions. These findings are consistent with the results from recent research on other federal disability programs such as SSDI (Autor and Duggan, 2003) . But the main contribution of our study relative to work for other disability programs is that, because the change to DC applied only to Vietnam veterans, we can use other veterans as a comparison group to obtain a more reliable estimate of the policy impact. Changes to the SSDI and SSI programs have applied equally to essentially all potential applicants of those programs, and it has therefore been difficult to disentangle the effect of changes to these programs from the effect of other factors such as macroeconomic conditions.
II. The Department of Veterans Affairs and the Disability Compensation Program
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans of military service and their families. At the end of the 2006 fiscal year, the VA estimated that there were 24 million veterans residing in the U.S. and that an additional 45 million were potentially eligible for VA benefits as family members or survivors of veterans. According to VA estimates, the number of living veterans fell by almost 10 percent from September of 2000 to September of 2006.
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As Table 1 demonstrates, this change in the veteran population has been associated with a substantial change in its composition, both because of mortality among veterans from earlier eras and because of entry by those serving during the Gulf War era. Most strikingly, the number of veterans from the World War II era declined by 44 percent (from 5.59 to 3.15 million) during this six-year period while the number of veterans from the Gulf War era increased by 51 percent (from 2.84 to 4.30 million). Veterans from the Vietnam era were the largest group in both years, with their ranks declining from 8.01 to 7.63 million but their share of all veterans increasing from 30 to 32 percent.
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It is worth noting that, while veterans are categorized based on their period of service, the number serving in specific conflicts tend to be much lower than the era-specific population data would suggest. For example, a recent estimate by the VA suggests that just 2.3 million of the 7.7 million Vietnam-era veterans alive in 2005 actually served in Vietnam.
A. VA Programs and Expenditures
Despite the significant decline in the veteran population since 2000, total VA expenditures have increased by an average of 6 percent per year during the same period. Table 2 lists total VA spending by category for the 1998 through 2005 fiscal years. As Table 2 shows, Compensation and Pension (CP) was the largest category of spending throughout this period, with the $32.1 billion in CP program benefits representing 46 percent of total spending by the VA during the 2005 fiscal year.
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provided medical care to 4.96 million patients during this same year at a cost of $30.7 billion. The remaining $7.5 billion in VA spending was spread across several categories, including operating expenses, construction, insurance, housing assistance, vocational rehabilitation, training programs, and burial and memorial benefits.
CP benefits are paid through four main programs. The largest in terms of both enrollment and expenditures is the Disability Compensation program, which according to the data displayed in Tables 3A and 3B, accounted for 75 percent of CP enrollment and 74 percent is not means-tested and an individual's DC benefits are not directly affected by his earnings. This is in contrast to the SSDI and SSI programs, which substantially reduce recipients' incentives to work. 3 According to the VBA's 2004 Annual Benefits Report, the approximate service dates by era were: World War II (September 1940 -July 1947 , Korea (June 1950 -January 1955 , Vietnam (August 1964 -May 1975 , and Gulf War (August 1990 -present) . Peacetime includes veterans who served during all other periods. These population estimates assign veterans who served in two or more eras to their earliest era of service. However a veteran who served during a conflict and during peacetime would always be assigned to the conflict.
The Disability Pension (DP) program is targeted at low-income wartime veterans who either are age 65 or older or are permanently and totally disabled (regardless of service-connectedness).
This program accounted for just 10 percent of CP enrollment and 9 percent of CP spending during the 2005 fiscal year. Beneficiaries of both the DC and DP programs are eligible for health care through the VHA and their expenditures accounted for much of the $30.7 billion in VHA spending during this same year. 4 The VA also paid $4.5 billion in cash benefits to the survivors of 0.54 million deceased veterans through the Death Compensation and Death Pension programs.
B. The Disability Compensation Program
To apply for Disability Compensation benefits, a veteran must submit an application at one of 63 regional offices of the Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA). At this stage, the 'authorization unit' collects necessary information regarding the claimant's application. These would include military service records and medical records from both VA medical facilities and private providers.
The application is then forwarded to a Rating Board, which determines whether each disability for which an application is submitted is service connected and assigns an appropriate degree of disability according to the Schedule for Rating Disabilities. These ratings range from 0 to 100 percent (in 10 percent increments) depending on the type and severity of the disability, with more severe conditions receiving a higher rating. 5 The recipient's combined disability rating (CDR) is a function of the individual ratings. If the award is made for just one condition then the CDR is equal to the rating for that condition. If the award is made for multiple conditions then the CDR is generally greater than any of the individual ratings, though the CDR is not simply a sum of the remaining ratings.
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If a DC award is made, the CDR is used to determine the monthly cash benefit amount, 4 The VHA provides care to other veterans as well, with 4.96 million served by the VHA during the 2004 fiscal year. 5 The possible ratings depend on the disability. For example type II diabetes can have ratings of 10, 20, 40, 60, or 100 percent, whereas arthritis can only be assigned a rating of 10 or 20 percent. For a list of conditions and possible ratings see http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/bookc.html. 6 If a claimant has multiple disabilities, only the claimant's residual ability is considered when determining the impact of the next disability considered. For example, if a veteran has two disabilities rated at 50%, then only 50% of his ability is considered when determining the impact of the second disability. Therefore, his CDR would be 80%; the sum of 50% for the first and 25% for the second (.5*(1-.5)) rounded to the nearest increment of 10%.
which is an increasing function of this rating. 7 The VBA considers the average reduction in earnings capacity to determine the benefit amount associated with each value of the CDR. 8 The average amounts for those rated 60 percent and higher are much greater than the baseline amounts because many of these recipients are eligible for the 100 percent payment amount because they are deemed unemployable. 9 DC recipients are assigned to eras based on where their most significant disability occurred. This will introduce some measurement error in our estimates for era-specific DC enrollment rates because the population data are constructed differently, though the importance of this should not change significantly over short periods of time.
C. The DC Program's Medical Eligibility Criteria
In a typical year more than 70 percent of DC applicants apply for benefits for more than one condition. One of three outcomes is possible -outright rejection, an award for some but not all conditions, or an award for all conditions. During the 2000 fiscal year, 14 percent of applications considered were awarded for all conditions, 48 percent for some conditions, and 38 percent were outright rejected (VBA, 2001 Proving that such a link existed for a condition such as diabetes would undoubtedly be much more difficult. Indeed a 2000 report by the National Academy of Sciences argued that the most important determinants of diabetes were physical inactivity, family history, and obesity. The report further argued that any increased risk posed by wartime exposure to herbicides appeared to be small or nonexistent (NAS, 2000) . Despite this, approximately 1.6 percent of DC recipients had diabetes 10 These decisions are frequently appealed. Existing DC recipients can also apply for an increase in their benefit amount, either because of an increase in the severity of a rated condition or because a new health problem arises. 11 A listing of the top twenty impairments at the end of each fiscal year can be found in the VBA's annual report. In September of 2000 more than 12 percent of DC recipients had "scars, other" as one of their qualifying conditions. Next most common were skeletal conditions (10.6 percent), knee impairment (9.8 percent), and arthritis due to trauma (8.0 percent). Tinnitus (6.2 percent) and PTSD (5.8 percent) were the 6 th and 9 th most common conditions. as one of their covered conditions in September of 2000. While this share is not trivial, diabetes was not one of the twenty most common conditions among DC recipients at that time, nor was it one of the ten most common conditions for DC recipients from any of the five major service eras.
III. The Institute of Medicine Report on Agent Orange Exposure
While But soon after the third IOM report was released in 1999, two new studies were released that provided supporting evidence of an association between dioxin exposure and diabetes (Calvert et. al., 1999; AFHS, 2000) . In October of 2000, the IOM evaluated the new studies in the context of previous research and concluded that there was suggestive evidence of an association between Agent
Orange exposure and the onset of diabetes (IOM, 2000) . This moved diabetes from category three to category two. In response to this report, the Secretary of the VA announced in November of 2000 that type II diabetes would be compensable under the DC program and, more importantly, that diabetes would be "presumptively" service-connected among those veterans who served in
Vietnam.
12 Diabetes would not become compensable, however, until July of 2001.
Shortly after this policy change, the growth in total DC enrollment increased substantially, as shown in Figure 1 . From September of 1996 to 2001, the number of DC recipients increased by just 0.6 percent per year. But during the next five years the annual growth rate was 3.3 percent, suggesting that the expansion in the eligibility criteria for Vietnam veterans was the main cause.
However this was not the only possible explanation for the increase in the rate of DC enrollment growth. For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act, which was enacted in 2000, required the VA to provide more assistance to DC applicants from all eras and to add more resources 12 No such presumption was made for other Vietnam-era veterans, with the exception of those who served in Korea in either 1968 or 1969 because the U.S. military used herbicides there during this period as well (VA, 2005) .
to the processing of DC applications (GAO, 2002) . Similarly the economic downturn and the corresponding increase in the unemployment rate may have caused some veterans to seek out alternative sources of income. And finally, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have led to a significant increase in the prevalence of disabilities among veterans serving in these conflicts. In the next two sections we estimate the impact of the policy change on DC enrollment and expenditures while attempting to control for the effects of these and other potentially confounding factors.
IV. The Effect of the Agent Orange Decision on Enrollment in the DC Program
Theoretically, one would expect the Agent Orange decision to have increased the propensity of veterans who served in Vietnam to apply for DC benefits. As Parsons (1980) , Bound (1989) , and others have noted, a key determinant of an individual's decision to apply for disability benefits is the probability that an award is made. It seems likely that this award probability increased following the The policy change would also have increased the incentive for existing DC recipients who served in Vietnam to apply for an increase in their monthly benefit. As described above, a veteran's DC benefit is a function of the combined disability rating (CDR), which generally increases when an additional condition is rated at 10 percent or more. Thus the Agent Orange decision could have increased both DC enrollment and the amount of benefits paid to existing DC recipients.
A. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact on DC Enrollment
In its publication titled Annual Benefits Report, the Veterans Benefit Administration provides detailed information each year on the characteristics of individuals receiving DC benefits at the end of the previous fiscal year. This information includes the number of DC recipients with certain diagnoses, the number with each of the eleven possible combined disability ratings (0 to 100 percent), the average monthly benefit received, and many other variables of interest. This data is further broken down by service era, which can be used to estimate the impact of the policy change described above on enrollment in the DC program.
Because the Agent Orange decision differentially affected veterans who served in the Vietnam War, one can essentially use veterans from other eras to control for other changes occurring at the same time that might also have affected DC enrollment. For example, the Veterans Claim
Assistance Act that was passed in the year 2000 influenced the DC application and award process for veterans from all eras (GAO, 2002) . To the extent that this policy, the economic downturn, and other factors did not have a different effect on Vietnam veterans than on veterans from other eras, their effects could be captured by the time effects Θ t in the following difference-in-differences model:
In this model, the outcome variable DC jt , is equal to one if individual j received DC benefits in year t and zero otherwise. The variable Vietnam j is equal to one if individual j is a Vietnam era veteran and zero otherwise. POST t is set equal to one after the policy takes effect, though to the extent that the impact is not immediate it may be more appropriate to allow the policy's impact to vary over time. 14 The parameter of particular interest in this model is β 3 , which is the coefficient on the interaction between the Vietnam j and POST t variables and represents the impact of the policy change on the probability of DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans. The key assumption for reliable estimation of β 3 is that there are not unobserved factors that influence DC enrollment differentially for Vietnam era veterans following the policy change.
Ideally when estimating a difference-in-differences model such as this one, the treatment and comparison groups would be identical on background characteristics such as age, education, and other possible determinants of DC enrollment. Of course, veterans who served in Vietnam will differ from other veterans in many respects. For example, they are older on average than Gulf War veterans and younger than veterans who served in Korea. But to the extent that the enrollment effect of these differences does not change at the time of the policy change, it should be captured by eraspecific fixed effects and era-specific time trends.
B. Choosing the Comparison Group
The data summarized in Table 6 lists the number of veterans receiving DC benefits by service era in September of each year from 1998 to 2006. This table also lists the percentage change in this number from the previous year, the number of veterans in each service era, and the fraction of veterans receiving DC benefits. Before considering the effect of the 2001 policy change, three points are worth noting from this table. First, the number of DC recipients who served in World War II is declining steadily throughout this time period because of the high mortality rate among this group. Second, the number of DC recipients who served in the Gulf War era increased rapidly throughout this period. While this has largely been driven by an increase in the number of Gulf War era veterans (those serving since August 1990), the increase in the fraction receiving benefits from 9.6 to 16.2 percent has been nearly as important. And finally, the trends from 1997 to 2000 in DC enrollment are fairly similar for the other three service eras. During this period, DC enrollment increased by an average of 0.8 and 1.7 percent per year, respectively, among Vietnam and peacetime era veterans, while declining by an average of 2.2 percent per year among those serving in the Korea conflict.
Given these trends, it seems clear that veterans from either the World War II or Gulf War eras would not be an appropriate comparison group for estimating the effect of the 2001 policy change on DC enrollment. Which of the other two eras is more appropriate is not as obvious. On the one hand, just prior to the Agent Orange decision, peacetime and Vietnam era veterans had similar rates of DC enrollment at 8.6 and 9.3 percent, respectively. The corresponding rate among Korean War era veterans was much lower at 4.9 percent. And in terms of average age, those classified as peacetime were much more similar to Vietnam era veterans because most served either shortly before or after the Vietnam War.
15 But on the other hand, many veterans from the Korean and Vietnam War eras incurred their disabilities in a military conflict and thus their service-connected disabilities may be more similar. But this seems unlikely to be as important as the age and DC enrollment similarities, and we therefore use individuals who served in peacetime as our comparison group. Table 1 demonstrates that veterans who served between the Korean and Vietnam War eras accounted for 53 percent of the peacetime era veteran population in September of 2000, with those serving after Vietnam but before the Gulf War era accounting for an additional 44 percent. 16 As described above, the assignment of DC recipients to eras (the numerator) differs somewhat from the assignment of veterans to eras for population estimates (the denominator). For example, to be counted as peacetime in the population data a veteran must have served only in peacetime. To be assigned to peacetime as a DC recipient the veteran must have incurred his most severe disability during peacetime. This will introduce measurement error in our estimated enrollment rates. But as long as the impact of this has a smooth trend over time, it should not bias this comparison or the results that follow. 17 The trends are similar through 2001 as well, though as our diagnosis data below demonstrates, the policy change had already started to have an effect by the end of 2001 and thus we consider it as post policy here. 
C. The Impact of the Agent Orange Decision on DC Enrollment Rates

V. The Effect on Existing DC Recipients and on Program Expenditures
The results in the previous section estimated the effect of the Agent Orange decision on the 18 This estimate and the one in the next paragraph would be almost identical if we instead used 2000 as the baseline. One possible source of bias in this estimate is that DC recipients who served both in peacetime and in Vietnam could, after qualifying from diabetes, switch from being classified as peacetime era to being classified as Vietnam era. While there is no way to rule out this possibility, the fact that the trend in DC enrollment for peacetime era veterans did not change significantly after 2001 suggests that it is not an important source of bias. 19 The number of DC recipients increased at a 0. We then investigate the effect of the policy change on total DC expenditures, which incorporates both the benefits paid to new recipients and the increase in benefits for existing recipients.
A. The Number of Vietnam Veterans Experiencing an Increase in DC Benefits
The top two rows of Table 7 
B. The Impact on Short and Long-Term Disability Compensation Expenditures
The effect of the Agent Orange decision on Disability Compensation expenditures depends on the characteristics of both those newly awarded DC benefits and of their counterparts already on the program who enjoyed an increase in their DC benefits. The main determinants of the short-term increase in spending are the CDR of new recipients and the increase in the CDR for existing recipients. If the 175,000 Vietnam veterans awarded benefits all had a CDR of just 10 percent, for example, then the effect on spending would be relatively modest. The same would be true if the 75,000 enjoying an increase in their benefits rose from a CDR of 10 to just 20 percent.
To estimate the effect of the Agent Orange decision on benefits paid, one would ideally use 22 To calculate this, we subtract the increase in the number of Vietnam era veterans with diabetes from 2000 to 2004 (144,492) from the increase in the number of new DC recipients with diabetes as a covered condition (99,364). 23 Some of those applying for an increase in benefits may have applied for multiple conditions or for an increase in ratings for existing conditions. Even if their diabetes applications were turned down, some recipients may have enjoyed an increase in benefits because of the application. This is one reason that our estimate may be too low. 
with V DC,j,t equal to the number of Vietnam era DC recipients in CDR j in year t. We attribute any difference between the actual and predicted number of recipients within each CDR to the Agent Orange decision. To estimate the effect on spending we simply multiply these CDR-specific effects by the average monthly benefit amount for that CDR. If our assumptions are accurate, this estimate captures the spending effect that is attributable both to new recipients and to existing recipients.
Of course, the trend in the number of Vietnam era DC recipients for each CDR may have changed after 2000 even in the absence of the change in the program's medical eligibility criteria.
For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act, the economic downturn, and related factors could have induced a break in trend. We therefore follow our approach from above and use veterans from the peacetime era as a control group. If our algorithm does a reasonable job of predicting the actual change in the number in each CDR bin for this group, it suggests that our estimates for the effect of 24 We multiply by 5. The discrepancy between our estimates and the actual change for all eleven possible CDRs is listed in column six. In every case our estimates are too low, which is not so surprising given the substantial increase in DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans from 2000 to 2006. But in general the discrepancies are greatest for the highest CDRs. For example, we predicted an increase of 38,752 in the number with ratings of 80 percent or more, but the actual increase was substantially higher at 100,937.
25 Multiplying these CDR-specific discrepancies by the average monthly benefit in Administration, which we cannot reliably estimate with the available data. On the other hand, the estimate may be biased upward given that mortality rates of Vietnam-era DC recipients affected by the Agent Orange decision are likely to be higher than for the average Vietnam era veteran. But even when we adjust our present value calculations to account for the higher baseline mortality rates of
Vietnam era DC recipients, 28 our estimated effect falls by just 19 percent to $37 billion.
VI. The Sensitivity of DC Expenditures to Local Economic Conditions
In contrast to the SSDI and SSI programs, an individual can receive DC benefits even if he has substantial labor market earnings. Thus whereas previous work has found that local economic conditions influence SSI and DI enrollment and expenditures (Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2003) , it is not obvious that such a link would exist for the DC program. But this previous research has also shown that, when the medical eligibility criteria for the SSDI program were liberalized, the sensitivity of the program to economic conditions increased. Thus while one might expect a smaller impact of economic conditions on DC expenditures than on spending for other disability programs, this effect may have increased following the 2001 policy change.
There are a number of possible channels through which economic conditions might influence DC expenditures. Perhaps the most obvious one is that veterans without a job or with a job that has 27 It also neglects any effect beyond 2033, as the VA does not make population projections beyond that year. 28 The mortality rate in 2000 of Vietnam era DC recipients was 1.55% versus 0.71% for all Vietnam era veterans. We therefore scale the estimated mortality rates for all Vietnam veterans by 2.18 when calculating the present value.
low wages are likely to have a greater demand for alternative sources of income than their observably similar counterparts with higher earnings. Additionally it seems plausible that a veteran would need to invest a considerable amount of time and effort to learn about and apply for the program. Because the opportunity cost of time will be lower for those who are out of work or have low paying jobs, this time cost may be less likely to dissuade them. Similarly, advocacy groups and other institutions may have responded to the change in the DC program by launching outreach efforts in those parts of the country where Vietnam veterans were known to have relatively few labor market opportunities.
To investigate whether the relationship between the DC program and labor market conditions changed after the Agent Orange decision, we utilize annual, county-level data on expenditures by the VA on the four Compensation and Pension programs described in Section 2. 29 The available data does not separate out DC spending from spending on the other three programs. But as Table 3B demonstrates, almost 75 percent of Compensation and Pension spending is for the DC program. We merge this Compensation and Pension (CP) expenditure data with annual, county-level unemployment rate data. 30 If local economic conditions had an important impact on the response of veterans to the change in economic conditions, one would expect to find a larger increase in CP expenditures in places with high rates of unemployment at the time of the policy change. To investigate this issue, we estimate models of the following type:
Additionally changes in Compensation and
29 Data on enrollment in these programs at the county level are not available. One advantage of considering expenditures rather than enrollment is that expenditures would capture the increase in benefits for existing recipients whereas enrollment would not. Virtually every county in the U.S. has nonzero CP spending in each year considered. 30 We obtained these data from the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. This data is available online at http://www.bls.gov/lau/. in which we use the log change in CP spending as our dependent variable. In all specifications we include the estimated change in the number of veterans living in the county. 31 In some specifications, we also control for the pre-existing trend in CP expenditures, as places with worse economic conditions may have been experiencing different changes in CP spending at the time of the policy change. The parameter of interest in this equation is β 1 , which represents the relationship between the county unemployment rate and the change in CP expenditures. We consider two time periods, the three years prior to (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) and the three years following (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) ) the policy change. If the Agent Orange decision increased the sensitivity of the program to economic conditions, one would expect β 1 to increase from the pre-policy to the post-policy period.
Our estimates for these models are summarized in Table 9 . In the next four columns we present the results from specifications in which we pool data from these two periods. Here we interact the unemployment rate measure with a POST indicator, which allows us to determine if the change in β 1 from the pre-policy to the post-policy period is statistically significant. We find that it is, and this significance remains when we introduce state fixed effects in the next two specifications. We do this to account for the possibility that state VBA 31 To estimate this we obtained the total number of veterans by county in 1990 and 2000 from the decennial census. We then calculated the growth rate and used this to impute the population estimate in 1998, 2001, and 2004. 32 Our results were qualitatively similar when we used the change in the level (rather than the log) of CP spending per veteran. For example, the analogous estimate for the specification summarized in column 2 was an insignificant -133 whereas the estimate from specification 4 was significant at the 1 percent level and equal to 2471.
offices differ in their outreach efforts or in their probability of making a DC award.
In the last two specifications we present the results from models in which the explanatory variable is the change in the unemployment rate rather than its level. The coefficient estimates of interest from these models, while not statistically significant, are qualitatively similar to the ones from the previous columns, suggesting that CP expenditures became more sensitive to local economic conditions after the policy change. with diabetes and all other DC spending. 33 The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 10 . It is worth noting that while the results presented here suggest that the sensitivity of the DC program to economic conditions increased as a result of the Agent Orange decision, other factors may be at least partly responsible for our findings. For example, it could be the case that the prevalence of diabetes among Vietnam veterans is greater in counties with high unemployment rates.
But our finding is consistent with the results of Autor and Duggan (2003) for the SSDI program, which found that the sensitivity of that program to economic conditions increased following the liberalization of the program's medical eligibility criteria in the mid-1980s. Such a connection for the DC program seems plausible given that the demand for alternative sources of income is likely to be greater among veterans affected by the policy who have low earnings or are out of work.
VII. Discussion
The findings in this paper suggest that a change in the medical eligibility criteria for the VA's Disability Compensation program that applied only to Vietnam veterans induced a 7.6 percentage point increase in disability enrollment among this group and increased the monthly benefit amount for an additional 3.3 percent. benefits on an all-or-nothing basis and do not allow recipients to have significant labor market earnings, the effect of such a change for these other programs might be quite different. However the findings do demonstrate that a relatively narrow change in the medical eligibility criteria for the DC program led to an increase in disability benefits for 10.9 percent of the individuals potentially affected by the policy. This makes it more plausible that the 1984 reforms to SSDI and SSI, which expanded the medical eligibility criteria for these programs, could have been largely responsible for the significant increase in enrollment for these two programs during the past two decades.
A potentially important direction for future research would be to estimate the effect of the induced increase in DC enrollment on the health, labor supply, and material well-being of veterans who served in Vietnam. (1) 1998-2001 2001-2004 1998-2004 Dependent variable in each column is equal to the change in the log of DVA Compensation and Pension expenditures. This county level data was obtained at http://www.va.gov/vetdata/GeographicInformation/index.htm. Specifications (1) (1) The dependent variable in all specifications is equal to the log change in compensation and pension expenditures ( 
